9 citations · 10 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
2 papers
cs.GT2010★ 9 cited
On the Interplay between Incentive Compatibility and Envy Freeness
Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +2
We study mechanisms for an allocation of goods among agents, where agents have no incentive to lie about their true values (incentive compatible) and for which no agent will seek t…
cs.GT2010★ 1 cited
Truth and Envy in Capacitated Allocation Games
Edith Cohen, Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat +2
We study auctions with additive valuations where agents have a limit on the number of goods they may receive. We refer to such valuations as {\em capacitated} and seek mechanisms t…