1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Fair Allocation with Optional Selling
Uriel Feige, Yotam Gafni
We consider fair allocation of indivisible goods in a setting in which agents have subjective valuation functions over the set of goods, and in addition, goods may be sold at given…
Scheduling With Time Discounts
Yotam Gafni, Aviv Yaish
We study a \emph{financial} version of the online problem of scheduling weighted packets with deadlines. The main novelty is that, while prior works assume packets have \emph{fixed…
Centralization and Stability in Formal Constitutions
Yotam Gafni
Consider a social-choice function (SCF) is chosen to decide votes in a formal system, including votes to replace the voting method itself. Agents vote according to their ex-ante be…
A Small Collusion is All You Need
Yotam Gafni
Transaction Fee Mechanisms (TFMs) study auction design in the Blockchain context, and emphasize robustness against miner and user collusion, moreso than traditional auction theory.…
Envious Explore and Exploit
Omer Ben-Porat, Yotam Gafni, Or Markovetzki
Explore-and-exploit tradeoffs play a key role in recommendation systems (RSs), aiming at serving users better by learning from previous interactions. Despite their commercial succe…
Incentive-Compatible Collusion-Resistance via Posted Prices
Matheus V. X. Ferreira, Yotam Gafni, Max Resnick
We consider a refinement to the notions of collusion-resistance in transaction fee mechanisms. In particular, we require that the collusion is by itself incentive-compatible and in…