5 papers
PICASSO: Scaling CHERI Use-After-Free Protection to Millions of Allocations using Colored Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Ruben Sturm, Hossam ElAtali +4
While the CHERI instruction-set architecture extensions for capabilities enable strong spatial memory safety, CHERI lacks built-in temporal safety, particularly for heap allocation…
SandCell: Sandboxing Rust Beyond Unsafe Code
Jialun Zhang, Merve Gulmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Rust is a modern systems programming language that ensures memory safety by enforcing ownership and borrowing rules at compile time. While the unsafe keyword allows programmers to…
Mon CHÃRI: Mitigating Uninitialized Memory Access with Conditional Capabilities
Merve Gülmez, Håkan Englund, Jan Tobias Mühlberg +1
Up to 10% of memory-safety vulnerabilities in languages like C and C++ stem from uninitialized variables. This work addresses the prevalence and lack of adequate software mitigatio…
BLACKOUT: Data-Oblivious Computation with Blinded Capabilities
Hossam ElAtali, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Lack of memory-safety and exposure to side channels are two prominent, persistent challenges for the secure implementation of software. Memory-safe programming languages promise to…
Do we still need canaries in the coal mine? Measuring shadow stack effectiveness in countering stack smashing
Hugo Depuydt, Merve Gülmez, Thomas Nyman +1
Stack canaries and shadow stacks are widely deployed mitigations to memory-safety vulnerabilities. While stack canaries are introduced by the compiler and rely on sentry values pla…