3 papers
cs.GT2026
Faster Verification of PJR via Mincuts
Drew Springham
PJR is a polynomial-time verifiable proportionality axiom for approval-based committee elections, but its known polynomial-time verification procedure relies on general submodu…
cs.GT2026
Multiwinner Voting with Spatial Preferences under Incomplete Information
Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1
In multiwinner elections with many candidates, as in participatory budgeting or large-scale recommendation, voters cannot plausibly evaluate every candidate, yet standard proportio…
cs.GT2025
Multiwinner Voting with Interval Preferences under Incomplete Information
Drew Springham, Edith Elkind, Bart de Keijzer +1
In multiwinner approval elections with many candidates, voters may struggle to determine their preferences over the entire slate of candidates. It is therefore of interest to explo…