1 citations · 1 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
The Communication Complexity of Instant-Runoff Voting
Élie de Panafieu, François Durand, Jérôme Lang
The communication complexity of a voting rule is the worst-case number of bits that n voters must transmit to a central authority under the most efficient elicitation protocol in a…
Super Condorcet Winners and Limit Coalitional Manipulability of IRV
François Durand, Élie de Panafieu, Guillem Perarnau
We study the limit CM rate of single-winner voting rules under Impartial Culture, defined as the probability that a preference profile is coalitionally manipulable in the limit of…
Why Instant-Runoff Voting Is So Resilient to Coalitional Manipulation: Phase Transitions in the Perturbed Culture
François Durand
Previous studies have shown that Instant-Runoff Voting (IRV) is highly resistant to coalitional manipulation (CM), though the theoretical reasons for this remain unclear. To addres…
Aggregating Correlated Estimations with (Almost) no Training
Theo Delemazure, François Durand, Fabien Mathieu
Many decision problems cannot be solved exactly and use several estimation algorithms that assign scores to the different available options. The estimation errors can have various…
Geometry on the Utility Space
François Durand, Benoît Kloeckner, Fabien Mathieu +1
We study the geometrical properties of the utility space (the space of expected utilities over a finite set of options), which is commonly used to model the preferences of an agent…
On the Manipulability of Voting Systems: Application to Multi-Carrier Networks
François Durand, Fabien Mathieu, Ludovic Noirie
Today, Internet involves many actors who are making revenues on it (operators, companies, service providers,...). It is therefore important to be able to make fair decisions in thi…