6 citations · 12 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for
21 papers
Stochastic evolutionary dynamics in structured populations: Network degree governs evolutionary stability
Vikash Kumar Dubey, Sagar Chakraborty
Stochasticity shapes evolutionary dynamics in finite populations beyond the reach of infinite-population theories. Using a stochastic birth--death framework on random regular netwo…
Stochastic ultimatum game: Spite-driven resource feedback fosters fairness
Arunava Patra, Prosanta Mandal, Sagar Chakraborty
Resource scarcity can fundamentally encourage antisocial behaviour, whereas resource abundance can promote fair behaviour. Experimental evidence indeed suggests that scarcity induc…
Upstream reciprocity versus downstream reciprocity: Catalyzing cooperation
Vikash Kumar Dubey, Sagar Chakraborty
Why would anyone help a stranger, knowing they may never meet again? Indirect reciprocity offers one of the most compelling evolutionary answers, yet its two canonical forms -- ups…
Overcoming unfairness via repeated interactions in mini-ultimatum game
Prosanta Mandal, Arunava Patra, Sagar Chakraborty
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests re…
Braess's paradox in tandem-running ants: When shortest path is not the quickest
Joy Das Bairagya, Udipta Chakraborti, Sumana Annagiri +1
Braess's paradox -- where adding network capacity increases travel time -- is typically attributed to selfish agents. Although eusocial colonies maximize collective fitness, we fin…
Collaboration drives phase transitions towards cooperation in prisoner's dilemma
Joy Das Bairagya, Jonathan Newton, Sagar Chakraborty
We present a collaboration ring model -- a network of players playing the prisoner's dilemma game and collaborating among the nearest neighbours by forming coalitions. The microsco…
Adaptive dynamics of eco-evolutionary repeated games: Effect of reward and punishment
Prosanta Mandal, Suman Chakraborty, Vaibhav Madhok +1
Long-term evolutionary processes can strongly influence common-pool resource conservation by generating new traits or behaviours that modify the feedback between population strateg…
Oscillatory evolutionarily stable state and limit cycle in replicator dynamics
Suman Chakraborty, Vikash Kumar Dubey, Vaibhav Madhok +1
The idea of evolutionarily stable state (ESS) of a population is a cornerstone of evolutionary game theory; moreover, it coincides with the game-theoretic concept of Nash equilibri…
Prejudice driven spite: A discontinuous phase transition in ultimatum game
Arunava Patra, C. F. Sagar Zephania, Sagar Chakraborty
In a mix of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals engaged in strategic interactions, the individual intensity of prejudice is expected to have effect on overall level of societal…
A game played by tandem-running ants: Hint of procedural rationality
Joy Das Bairagya, Udipta Chakraborti, Sumana Annagiri +1
Navigation through narrow passages during colony relocation by the tandem-running ants, , is a tour de force of biological traffic coordinatio…
Coordinating cooperation in stag-hunt game: Emergence of evolutionarily stable procedural rationality
Joy Das Bairagya, Sagar Chakraborty
Humans are bounded rational at best and this, we argue, has worked in their favour in the hunter-gatherer society where emergence of a coordinated action, leading to cooperation, i…
Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty
Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to bet…
Bayesian eco-evolutionary game dynamics
Arunava Patra, Joy Das Bairagya, Sagar Chakraborty
The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped…
Oscillatory equilibrium in asymmetric evolutionary games: Generalizing evolutionarily stable strategy
Vikash Kumar Dubey, Suman Chakraborty, Sagar Chakraborty
The concept of evolutionarily stability and its relation with the fixed points of the replicator equation are important aspects of evolutionary game dynamics. In the light of the f…
Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: Dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives
Vikash Kumar Dubey, Suman Chakraborty, Arunava Patra +1
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are…
Noisy information channel mediated prevention of the tragedy of the commons
Samrat Sohel Mondal, Sagar Chakraborty
Synergy between evolutionary dynamics of cooperation and fluctuating state of shared resource being consumed by the cooperators is essential for averting the tragedy of the commons…
Eclectic Notes on Uncertainty, Information, and Classical Dynamics
Sagar Chakraborty
Information is everywhere in nature which is very uncertain and unpredictable. But information, in itself, is a very ambiguous term. In this cursory write-up, we attempt to underst…
Repeated quantum game as a stochastic game: Effects of the shadow of the future and entanglement
Archan Mukhopadhyay, Saikat Sur, Tanay Saha +2
We present a systematic investigation of the quantum games, constructed using a novel repeated game protocol, when played repeatedly ad infinitum. We focus on establishing that suc…
Replicator-mutator dynamics of Rock-Paper-Scissors game: Learning through mistakes
Suman Chakraborty, Ishita Agarwal, Sagar Chakraborty
We generalize the Bush--Mosteller learning, the Roth--Erev learning, and the social learning to include mistakes such that the nonlinear replicator-mutator equation with either add…
Inferring to C or not to C: Evolutionary games with Bayesian inferential strategies
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Ayan Paul +1
Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an a…
Selection-recombination-mutation dynamics: Gradient, limit cycle, and closed invariant curve
Suman Chakraborty, Sagar Chakraborty
In this paper, the replicator dynamics of the two-locus two-allele system under weak mutation and weak selection is investigated in a generation-wise non-overlapping unstructured p…