3 citations · 3 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
7 papers
Stochastic ultimatum game: Spite-driven resource feedback fosters fairness
Arunava Patra, Prosanta Mandal, Sagar Chakraborty
Resource scarcity can fundamentally encourage antisocial behaviour, whereas resource abundance can promote fair behaviour. Experimental evidence indeed suggests that scarcity induc…
Overcoming unfairness via repeated interactions in mini-ultimatum game
Prosanta Mandal, Arunava Patra, Sagar Chakraborty
Repeated interactions are ubiquitous and known to promote social behaviour. While research often focuses on cooperation in the Prisoner's Dilemma, experimental evidence suggests re…
Prejudice driven spite: A discontinuous phase transition in ultimatum game
Arunava Patra, C. F. Sagar Zephania, Sagar Chakraborty
In a mix of prejudiced and unprejudiced individuals engaged in strategic interactions, the individual intensity of prejudice is expected to have effect on overall level of societal…
Bayesian tit-for-tat fosters cooperation in evolutionary stochastic games
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Sagar Chakraborty
Learning from experience is a key feature of decision-making in cognitively complex organisms. Strategic interactions involving Bayesian inferential strategies can enable us to bet…
Bayesian eco-evolutionary game dynamics
Arunava Patra, Joy Das Bairagya, Sagar Chakraborty
The symbiotic relationship between the frameworks of classical game theory and evolutionary game theory is well-established. However, evolutionary game theorists have mostly tapped…
Evolutionarily stable strategy in asymmetric games: Dynamical and information-theoretical perspectives
Vikash Kumar Dubey, Suman Chakraborty, Arunava Patra +1
Evolutionarily stable strategy (ESS) is the defining concept of evolutionary game theory. It has a fairly unanimously accepted definition for the case of symmetric games which are…
Inferring to C or not to C: Evolutionary games with Bayesian inferential strategies
Arunava Patra, Supratim Sengupta, Ayan Paul +1
Strategies for sustaining cooperation and preventing exploitation by selfish agents in repeated games have mostly been restricted to Markovian strategies where the response of an a…