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cs.GT2026
Truthful-in-Expectation Mechanism with Constant Maximin-Share Guarantee
Mengfan Ma, Biaoshuai Tao, Fangxiao Wang
We study the truthful and fair allocation of indivisible goods to strategic agents with additive valuations. Babaioff, Feige, and Manaker Morag [FOCS 2026] gave a randomized me…
cs.GT2026
Breaking the 4-Approximation Barrier in Strategyproof Two-Facility Location
Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng
We study strategyproof mechanism design without transfers for the two-facility location problem in metric spaces. A mechanism selects two facility locations based on agents' report…
cs.GT2026
Searching for Optimal Prices in Two-Sided Markets
Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng +1
We investigate online pricing in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices based on binary accept/reject feedback to maximize gains-from-trade (GFT) or profit. We…