6 papers · 1 filter
Breaking the 4-Approximation Barrier in Strategyproof Two-Facility Location
Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng
We study strategyproof mechanism design without transfers for the two-facility location problem in metric spaces. A mechanism selects two facility locations based on agents' report…
Searching for Optimal Prices in Two-Sided Markets
Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng +1
We investigate online pricing in two-sided markets where a platform repeatedly posts prices based on binary accept/reject feedback to maximize gains-from-trade (GFT) or profit. We…
Contextual Search in Principal-Agent Games: The Curse of Degeneracy
Yiding Feng, Mengfan Ma, Bo Peng +1
In this work, we introduce and study contextual search in general principal-agent games, where a principal repeatedly interacts with agents by offering contracts based on contextua…
Contracting with a Mechanism Designer
Tian Bai, Yiding Feng, Yaohao Liu +2
This paper explores the economic interactions within modern crowdsourcing markets. In these markets, employers issue requests for tasks, platforms facilitate the recruitment of cro…
Facility Assignment with Fair Cost Sharing: Equilibrium and Mechanism Design
Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao, Tian Bai +1
In the one-dimensional facility assignment problem, m facilities and n agents are positioned along the real line. Each agent will be assigned to a single facility to receive servic…
Facility Location Games Beyond Single-Peakedness: the Entrance Fee Model
Mengfan Ma, Mingyu Xiao, Tian Bai +1
The facility location game has been studied extensively in mechanism design. In the classical model, each agent's cost is solely determined by her distance to the nearest facility.…