activity
20232026
most citedCross-Chain Sealed-Bid Auctions Using Confidential Compute Blockchains

2 citations · 4 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.CE2026

Executable Arbitrage and Market Efficiency in Prediction Markets

Jonas Gebele, Timm Mutzel, Florian Matthes

Deterministic payoff identities imply no-arbitrage bounds in winner-takes-all prediction markets, but violations of these bounds need not be exploitable before settlement. We disti…

cs.CE2026

When Certainty Is Not Worth It: Capital Lock-Up and Settlement Discounting in Prediction Markets

Jonas Gebele, Florian Matthes

Collateralized prediction markets are contingent-claim markets in which economic uncertainty can disappear before winning claims become redeemable. This paper studies the pricing e…

cs.CE2026

Semantic Non-Fungibility and Violations of the Law of One Price in Prediction Markets

Jonas Gebele, Florian Matthes

Prediction markets are designed to aggregate dispersed information about future events, yet today's ecosystem is fragmented across heterogeneous operator-run platforms and blockcha…

cs.CR2025★ 2 cited

Cross-Chain Sealed-Bid Auctions Using Confidential Compute Blockchains

Jonas Gebele, Timm Mutzel, Burak Oez +1

Sealed-bid auctions ensure fair competition and efficient allocation but are often deployed on centralized infrastructure, enabling opaque manipulation. Public blockchains eliminat…

cs.CR2025★ 1 cited

Cross-Chain Arbitrage: The Next Frontier of MEV in Decentralized Finance

Burak Öz, Christof Ferreira Torres, Christoph Schlegel +4

Decentralized finance (DeFi) markets spread across Layer-1 (L1) and Layer-2 (L2) blockchains rely on arbitrage to keep prices aligned. Today most price gaps are closed against cent…

cs.CR2025

CRSet: Private Non-Interactive Verifiable Credential Revocation

Felix Hoops, Jonas Gebele, Florian Matthes

Like any digital certificate, Verifiable Credentials (VCs) require a way to revoke them in case of an error or key compromise. Existing solutions for VC revocation, most prominentl…

cs.CR2024

Playing the MEV Game on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain

Burak Öz, Jonas Gebele, Parshant Singh +2

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) searching has gained prominence on the Ethereum blockchain since the surge in Decentralized Finance activities. In Ethereum, MEV extraction primaril…

cs.CR2023★ 1 cited

A Study of MEV Extraction Techniques on a First-Come-First-Served Blockchain

Burak Öz, Filip Rezabek, Jonas Gebele +2

Maximal Extractable Value (MEV) has become a significant incentive on blockchain networks, referring to the value captured through the manipulation of transaction execution order a…