3 papers
econ.TH2026
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
econ.TH2026
The comparative statics of dominance
Gregorio Curello, Ludvig Sinander, Mark Whitmeyer
In finite problems comprising objects, cases, and an object- and case-contingent payoff function, we study the comparative statics of the set of undominated objects, meaning those…
econ.TH2025
Optimally Dictatorial Committees
D. Carlos Akkar
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who ca…