4 papers
Misperception and informativeness in statistical discrimination
Matteo Escudé, Paula Onuchic, Ludvig Sinander +1
We study the interplay of information and prior (mis)perceptions in a Phelps-Aigner-Cain-type model of statistical discrimination in the labor market. We decompose the effect on av…
Separating the Wheat from the Chaff
Johannes Hörner, Paula Onuchic
We study a reputational cheap-talk environment in which a judge, who is privately and imperfectly informed about a state, must choose between two speakers of unknown reliability. E…
Recent Contributions to Theories of Discrimination
Paula Onuchic
This paper surveys the literature on theories of discrimination, focusing mainly on new contributions. Recent theories expand on the traditional taste-based and statistical discrim…
Optimally Dictatorial Committees
D. Carlos Akkar
I study the optimal voting mechanism for a committee that must decide whether to enact or block a policy of unknown benefit. Information can come both from committee members who ca…