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20072026
most citedEfficiency in Truthful Auctions via a Social Network

13 citations · 29 across the 16 of their papers we have counts for

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10 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2023

Multi-Stage Generalized Deferred Acceptance Mechanism: Strategyproof Mechanism for Handling General Hereditary Constraints

Kei Kimura, Kwei-guu Liu, Zhaohong Sun +2

The theory of two-sided matching has been extensively developed and applied to many real-life application domains. As the theory has been applied to increasingly diverse types of e…

cs.GT2023★ 3 cited

Towards Optimal Subsidy Bounds for Envy-freeable Allocations

Yasushi Kawase, Kazuhisa Makino, Hanna Sumita +2

We study the fair division of indivisible items with subsidies among agents, where the absolute marginal valuation of each item is at most one. Under monotone valuations (where…

cs.GT2022

Daycare Matching in Japan: Transfers and Siblings

Zhaohong Sun, Yoshihiro Takenami, Daisuke Moriwaki +2

In this paper, we study a daycare matching problem in Japan and report the design and implementation of a new centralized algorithm, which is going to be deployed in one municipali…

cs.GT2021

Fair and Truthful Mechanism with Limited Subsidy

Hiromichi Goko, Ayumi Igarashi, Yasushi Kawase +5

The notion of \emph{envy-freeness} is a natural and intuitive fairness requirement in resource allocation. With indivisible goods, such fair allocations are unfortunately not guara…

cs.GT2019★ 6 cited

Strategy-Proof and Non-Wasteful Multi-Unit Auction via Social Network

Takehiro Kawasaki, Nathanael Barrot, Seiji Takanashi +2

Auctions via social network, pioneered by Li et al. (2017), have been attracting considerable attention in the literature of mechanism design for auctions. However, no known mechan…

cs.GT2019★ 7 cited

False-Name-Proof Facility Location on Discrete Structures

Taiki Todo, Nodoka Okada, Makoto Yokoo

We consider the problem of locating a single facility on a vertex in a given graph based on agents' preferences, where the domain of the preferences is either single-peaked or sing…

cs.GT2019

Diffusion and Auction on Graphs

Bin Li, Dong Hao, Dengji Zhao +1

Auction is the common paradigm for resource allocation which is a fundamental problem in human society. Existing research indicates that the two primary objectives, the seller's re…

cs.GT2019

Robustness against Agent Failure in Hedonic Games

Ayumi Igarashi, Kazunori Ota, Yuko Sakurai +1

We study how stability can be maintained even after any set of at most k players leave their groups, in the context of hedonic games. While stability properties ensure an outcome t…

cs.GT2016

Repeated Multimarket Contact with Private Monitoring: A Belief-Free Approach

Atsushi Iwasaki, Tadashi Sekiguchi, Shun Yamamoto +1

This paper studies repeated games where two players play multiple duopolistic games simultaneously (multimarket contact). A key assumption is that each player receives a noisy and…

cs.GT2011

False-name-proof Mechanisms for Hiring a Team

Atsushi Iwasaki, David Kempe, Mahyar Salek +1

We study the problem of hiring a team of selfish agents to perform a task. Each agent is assumed to own one or more elements of a set system, and the auctioneer is trying to purcha…