1 citations · 1 across the 6 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers
Computing stable limit cycles of learning in games
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou
Many well-studied learning dynamics, such as fictitious play and the replicator, are known to not converge in general -player games. The simplest mode of non-convergence is cycl…
On the Complexity of Learning Nash Equilibria
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou, Georgios Piliouras
We know that the Nash equilibria of a game cannot be computed efficiently unless . But can they be learned? Are there dynamics that (1) can be computed efficiently by the…
Sink equilibria and the attractors of learning in games
Oliver Biggar, Christos Papadimitriou
Characterizing the limit behavior -- that is, the attractors -- of learning dynamics is one of the most fundamental open questions in game theory. In recent work on this front, it…
No-regret learning in harmonic games: Extrapolation in the face of conflicting interests
Davide Legacci, Panayotis Mertikopoulos, Christos H. Papadimitriou +2
The long-run behavior of multi-agent learning - and, in particular, no-regret learning - is relatively well-understood in potential games, where players have aligned interests. By…
Charting the Shapes of Stories with Game Theory
Constantinos Daskalakis, Ian Gemp, Yanchen Jiang +3
Stories are records of our experiences and their analysis reveals insights into the nature of being human. Successful analyses are often interdisciplinary, leveraging mathematical…
Swim till You Sink: Computing the Limit of a Game
Rashida Hakim, Jason Milionis, Christos Papadimitriou +1
During 2023, two interesting results were proven about the limit behavior of game dynamics: First, it was shown that there is a game for which no dynamics converges to the Nash equ…