3 papers
econ.TH2026
Racing to Ruin
Drew Fudenberg, Andrew Koh
We study R&D competition in the shadow of disaster: advancing the technology frontier raises the risk of permanently ending all firms' payoffs. Under perfect monitoring and common…
econ.TH2024
Informational Puts
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: s…
econ.TH2024
Inertial Coordination Games
Andrew Koh, Ricky Li, Kei Uzui
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about ov…