1 citations · 1 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
8 papers
Balanced Social Learning
Andrew Koh, Ricky Li
When is social learning efficient if agents have heterogeneous preferences over a set of actions? When myopic agents generate information only about the action they choose, efficie…
Cooperating against Catastrophe
Drew Fudenberg, Andrew Koh
We study a continuous-time game in which two firms choose how quickly to advance their capabilities while an exogenous safety threshold advances at a fixed rate. When the capabilit…
Racing to Ruin
Drew Fudenberg, Andrew Koh
We study R&D competition in the shadow of disaster: advancing the technology frontier raises the risk of permanently ending all firms' payoffs. Under perfect monitoring and common…
Technology Speed Limits
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
We study optimal technology regulation when private learning occurs both through doing (scaling up the technology) and through waiting (as time passes). We show that an adaptive sp…
Informational Puts
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Kei Uzui
We analyze how dynamic information should be provided to uniquely implement the largest equilibrium in binary-action coordination games. The designer offers an informational put: s…
Inertial Coordination Games
Andrew Koh, Ricky Li, Kei Uzui
We analyze inertial coordination games: dynamic coordination games with an endogenously changing state that depends on (i) a persistent fundamental players privately learn about ov…
Robust Technology Regulation
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo
We analyze how uncertain technologies should be robustly regulated and how regulation should evolve with new information. An adaptive sandbox comprising a zero marginal tax up to a…
Persuasion and Optimal Stopping
Andrew Koh, Sivakorn Sanguanmoo, Weijie Zhong
We develop a duality-based first-order approach to dynamic persuasion in optimal stopping problems with general action-, state-, and time-dependent preferences. A direct-communicat…