1 citations · 1 across the 4 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers
Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching under Two-Sided Uncertainty
Andreas Athanasopoulos, Anne-Marie George, Christos Dimitrakakis
We study a sequential learning problem for stable matchings in two-sided markets where preferences on both sides are initially unknown. We focus on a centralized setting where an a…
Rawlsian many-to-one matching with non-linear utility
Hortence Nana, Andreas Athanasopoulos, Christos Dimitrakakis
We study a many-to-one matching problem, such as the college admission problem, where each college can admit multiple students. Unlike classical models, colleges evaluate sets of s…
Learning in Matching Games with Bandit Feedback
Andreas Athanasopoulos, Christos Dimitrakakis
We introduce a learning problem in a generalized two-sided matching market, where agents select actions to interact with their match. Specifically, we consider a setting in which m…
Probably Correct Optimal Stable Matching for Two-Sided Markets Under Uncertainty
Andreas Athanasopoulos, Anne-Marie George, Christos Dimitrakakis
We consider a learning problem for the stable marriage model under unknown preferences for the left side of the market. We focus on the centralized case, where at each time step, a…
Eliciting Kemeny Rankings
Anne-Marie George, Christos Dimitrakakis
We formulate the problem of eliciting agents' preferences with the goal of finding a Kemeny ranking as a Dueling Bandits problem. Here the bandits' arms correspond to alternatives…