7 citations · 9 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), rew…
Online Fair Division With Subsidy: When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist, and at What Cost?
Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items arriving online, among (offline) agents. Although envy-freeness has emerged as the archetypal fairness notion, e…
Probing EFX via PMMS: (Non-)Existence Results in Discrete Fair Division
Jarosław Byrka, Franciszek Malinka, Tomasz Ponitka
We study the fair division of indivisible items and provide new insights into the EFX problem, which is widely regarded as the central open question in fair division, and the PMMS…
The Panel Complexity of Sortition: Is 12 Angry Men Enough?
Johannes Brustle, Simone Fioravanti, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Sortition is the practice of delegating public decision-making to randomly selected panels. Recently, it has gained momentum worldwide through its use in citizens' assemblies, spar…
Budget-Feasible Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided…
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…