7 citations · 9 across the 10 of their papers we have counts for
12 papers · 1 filter
Epistemic Pairwise Maximin Share
Michal Feldman, Amos Fiat, Yael Nissan +1
We introduce epistemic pairwise maximin share (EPMMS), a new fairness notion for fair division of indivisible goods. Two fundamental notions in this setting are envy-freeness up to…
Anonymous Contracts
Johannes Brustle, Paul Duetting, Stefano Leonardi +2
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the fu…
Equal-Pay Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design, where a principal incentivizes a team of agents to take costly actions that jointly determine the project success via a combinatorial reward f…
One Action Too Many: Inapproximability of Budgeted Combinatorial Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
We study multi-agent contract design with combinatorial actions, under budget constraints, and for a broad class of objective functions, including profit (principal's utility), rew…
Online Fair Division With Subsidy: When Do Envy-Free Allocations Exist, and at What Cost?
Pooja Kulkarni, Ruta Mehta, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study the problem of fairly allocating indivisible items arriving online, among (offline) agents. Although envy-freeness has emerged as the archetypal fairness notion, e…
Probing EFX via PMMS: (Non-)Existence Results in Discrete Fair Division
Jarosław Byrka, Franciszek Malinka, Tomasz Ponitka
We study the fair division of indivisible items and provide new insights into the EFX problem, which is widely regarded as the central open question in fair division, and the PMMS…
The Panel Complexity of Sortition: Is 12 Angry Men Enough?
Johannes Brustle, Simone Fioravanti, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Sortition is the practice of delegating public decision-making to randomly selected panels. Recently, it has gained momentum worldwide through its use in citizens' assemblies, spar…
Budget-Feasible Contracts
Michal Feldman, Yoav Gal-Tzur, Tomasz Ponitka +1
The problem of computing near-optimal contracts in combinatorial settings has recently attracted significant interest in the computer science community. Previous work has provided…
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…
Proportionally Fair Makespan Approximation
Michal Feldman, Jugal Garg, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study fair mechanisms for the classic job scheduling problem on unrelated machines with the objective of minimizing the makespan. This problem is equivalent to minimizing the eg…
Breaking the Envy Cycle: Best-of-Both-Worlds Guarantees for Subadditive Valuations
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Vishnu V. Narayan +1
We study best-of-both-worlds guarantees for the fair division of indivisible items among agents with subadditive valuations. Our main result establishes the existence of a random a…
On Optimal Tradeoffs between EFX and Nash Welfare
Michal Feldman, Simon Mauras, Tomasz Ponitka
A major problem in fair division is how to allocate a set of indivisible resources among agents fairly and efficiently. The goal of this work is to characterize the tradeoffs betwe…