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cs.GT2025
Succinct Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti
Real-world contracts are often ambiguous. While recent work by Dütting, Feldman, Peretz, and Samuelson (EC 2023, Econometrica 2024) demonstrates that ambiguous contracts can yield…
cs.GT2025
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…