2 citations · 2 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for
6 papers · 1 filter
Fair Prophets
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Mathieu Molina
We initiate the study of -fair prophet inequalities. This interpolates between utilitarian welfare , Nash welfare , and Rawlsian max-min fairness . G…
Combinatorial Contracts Through Demand Types
Elizabeth Baldwin, Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman +1
In the combinatorial action model of contract design, a principal delegates a complex project to an agent, incentivizing a subset of actions from a ground set of actions, via a…
Anonymous Contracts
Johannes Brustle, Paul Duetting, Stefano Leonardi +2
We study a multi-agent contracting problem where agents exert costly effort to achieve individually observable binary outcomes. While the principal can theoretically extract the fu…
Succinct Ambiguous Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Yarden Rashti
Real-world contracts are often ambiguous. While recent work by Dütting, Feldman, Peretz, and Samuelson (EC 2023, Econometrica 2024) demonstrates that ambiguous contracts can yield…
The Pseudo-Dimension of Contracts
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Tomasz Ponitka +1
Algorithmic contract design studies scenarios where a principal incentivizes an agent to exert effort on her behalf. In this work, we focus on settings where the agent's type is dr…
Algorithmic Contract Theory: A Survey
Paul Duetting, Michal Feldman, Inbal Talgam-Cohen
A contract is an economic tool used by a principal to incentivize one or more agents to exert effort on her behalf, by defining payments based on observable performance measures. A…