activity
20232026
most citedDecentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks

1 citations · 1 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

8 papers

cs.GT2026

Minimizing Cumulative Envy in Allocating a Sequence of Items

Paul W. Goldberg, Isaac Robinson, Nicholas Teh

We study temporal fair division with indivisible goods that arrive sequentially and must be allocated irrevocably. In contrast to the usual online model, we assume that valuations…

cs.GT2026

Online Fair Division with Budget Constraints

Saar Cohen, Nicholas Teh, Paul W. Goldberg +1

We study an online variant of discrete fair division under generalized assignment budget constraints. Goods arrive one at a time and must be assigned irrevocably to a feasible agen…

cs.GT2026

Efficient Ensemble Selection from Binary and Pairwise Feedback

Tzeh Yuan Neoh, Nicholas Teh, Je Qin Chooi +2

Organizations increasingly deploy multiple AI systems across task domains, but selecting a small, high-performing ensemble can require costly model calls, benchmark runs, and human…

cs.GT2026

Learning Unanimously Acceptable Lotteries via Queries

Davin Choo, Paul W. Goldberg, Nicholas Teh

Many high-stakes AI deployments proceed only if every stakeholder deems the system acceptable relative to their own minimum standard. With randomization over a finite menu of optio…

econ.TH2026

Decentralized Trading Networks: Equilibria and Fairness

Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock +1

We explore stability and fairness considerations in decentralized networked markets with bilateral contracts, building on the trading networks framework [Hatfield et al., 2013]. In…

cs.GT2026

Avoiding the Worst: The Computational Complexity of Not Worst-Responding

Mete Şeref Ahunbay, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock +3

Finding, counting, or determining the existence of pure Nash equilibria, where players must play optimally given the others' actions, are known to be computationally intractable pr…

cs.GT2025★ 1 cited

Decentralized Convergence to Equilibrium Prices in Trading Networks

Edwin Lock, Benjamin Patrick Evans, Eleonora Kreacic +4

We propose a decentralized market model in which agents can negotiate bilateral contracts. This builds on a similar, but centralized, model of trading networks introduced by Hatfie…

econ.TH2023

Competitive and Revenue-Optimal Pricing with Budgets

Simon Finster, Paul W. Goldberg, Edwin Lock

In markets with budget-constrained buyers, competitive equilibria need not be efficient in the utilitarian sense, or maximise the seller's revenue. We consider a setting with multi…