activity
20232026
most citedThe Reversal Curse: LLMs trained on "A is B" fail to learn "B is A"

32 citations · 51 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

11 papers

cs.LG2026

Predicting LLM Safety Before Release by Simulating Deployment

Marcus Williams, Hannah Sheahan, Cameron Raymond +8

Pre-deployment safety evaluations aim to inform the downstream risks of releasing a new AI model. Yet most evaluations provide limited evidence about how often undesired model beha…

cs.LG2025

Async Control: Stress-testing Asynchronous Control Measures for LLM Agents

Asa Cooper Stickland, Jan Michelfeit, Arathi Mani +6

LLM-based software engineering agents are increasingly used in real-world development tasks, often with access to sensitive data or security-critical codebases. Such agents could i…

cs.AI2025

How to evaluate control measures for LLM agents? A trajectory from today to superintelligence

Tomek Korbak, Mikita Balesni, Buck Shlegeris +1

As LLM agents grow more capable of causing harm autonomously, AI developers will rely on increasingly sophisticated control measures to prevent possibly misaligned agents from caus…

cs.CY2025

Safety Cases: A Scalable Approach to Frontier AI Safety

Benjamin Hilton, Marie Davidsen Buhl, Tomek Korbak +1

Safety cases - clear, assessable arguments for the safety of a system in a given context - are a widely-used technique across various industries for showing a decision-maker (e.g.…

cs.AI2025

A sketch of an AI control safety case

Tomek Korbak, Joshua Clymer, Benjamin Hilton +2

As LLM agents gain a greater capacity to cause harm, AI developers might increasingly rely on control measures such as monitoring to justify that they are safe. We sketch how devel…

cs.CY2024★ 2 cited

Safety case template for frontier AI: A cyber inability argument

Arthur Goemans, Marie Davidsen Buhl, Jonas Schuett +4

Frontier artificial intelligence (AI) systems pose increasing risks to society, making it essential for developers to provide assurances about their safety. One approach to offerin…

cs.CR2024★ 2 cited

Towards evaluations-based safety cases for AI scheming

Mikita Balesni, Marius Hobbhahn, David Lindner +13

We sketch how developers of frontier AI systems could construct a structured rationale -- a 'safety case' -- that an AI system is unlikely to cause catastrophic outcomes through sc…

cs.CL2024

Lessons from Studying Two-Hop Latent Reasoning

Mikita Balesni, Tomek Korbak, Owain Evans

Large language models can use chain-of-thought (CoT) to externalize reasoning, potentially enabling oversight of capable LLM agents. Prior work has shown that models struggle at tw…

cs.CL2024★ 7 cited

Looking Inward: Language Models Can Learn About Themselves by Introspection

Felix J Binder, James Chua, Tomek Korbak +6

Humans acquire knowledge by observing the external world, but also by introspection. Introspection gives a person privileged access to their current state of mind (e.g., thoughts a…

cs.CL2023★ 32 cited

The Reversal Curse: LLMs trained on "A is B" fail to learn "B is A"

Lukas Berglund, Meg Tong, Max Kaufmann +4

We expose a surprising failure of generalization in auto-regressive large language models (LLMs). If a model is trained on a sentence of the form "A is B", it will not automaticall…

cs.CL2023★ 8 cited

Taken out of context: On measuring situational awareness in LLMs

Lukas Berglund, Asa Cooper Stickland, Mikita Balesni +5

We aim to better understand the emergence of `situational awareness' in large language models (LLMs). A model is situationally aware if it's aware that it's a model and can recogni…