activity
20242026
most citedGPT-4o System Card

164 citations · 204 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

9 papers

cs.AR2026

Performance Verification of the AmpereOne CPU Core

Doa'a Al-Otoom, Nicholas Kelly, Aaron Lindsay +16

As process technology scaling slows, microarchitectural innovation has become the primary driver of performance gains, making pre-silicon Performance Verification (PV) more critica…

cs.CL2026★ 18 cited

OpenAI GPT-5 System Card

Aaditya Singh, Adam Fry, Adam Perelman +483

This is the system card published alongside the OpenAI GPT-5 launch, August 2025. GPT-5 is a unified system with a smart and fast model that answers most questions, a deeper reason…

cs.LG2025

Estimating Worst-Case Frontier Risks of Open-Weight LLMs

Eric Wallace, Olivia Watkins, Miles Wang +2

In this paper, we study the worst-case frontier risks of releasing gpt-oss. We introduce malicious fine-tuning (MFT), where we attempt to elicit maximum capabilities by fine-tuning…

cs.CL2025

gpt-oss-120b & gpt-oss-20b Model Card

OpenAI, :, Sandhini Agarwal +124

We present gpt-oss-120b and gpt-oss-20b, two open-weight reasoning models that push the frontier of accuracy and inference cost. The models use an efficient mixture-of-expert trans…

cs.LG2025

Trading Inference-Time Compute for Adversarial Robustness

Wojciech Zaremba, Evgenia Nitishinskaya, Boaz Barak +8

We conduct experiments on the impact of increasing inference-time compute in reasoning models (specifically OpenAI o1-preview and o1-mini) on their robustness to adversarial attack…

cs.CL2025★ 13 cited

Deliberative Alignment: Reasoning Enables Safer Language Models

Melody Y. Guan, Manas Joglekar, Eric Wallace +12

As large-scale language models increasingly impact safety-critical domains, ensuring their reliable adherence to well-defined principles remains a fundamental challenge. We introdu…

cs.CL2024★ 164 cited

GPT-4o System Card

OpenAI, :, Aaron Hurst +416

GPT-4o is an autoregressive omni model that accepts as input any combination of text, audio, image, and video, and generates any combination of text, audio, and image outputs. It's…

cs.CR2024★ 1 cited

Covert Malicious Finetuning: Challenges in Safeguarding LLM Adaptation

Danny Halawi, Alexander Wei, Eric Wallace +3

Black-box finetuning is an emerging interface for adapting state-of-the-art language models to user needs. However, such access may also let malicious actors undermine model safety…

cs.CR2024★ 8 cited

The Instruction Hierarchy: Training LLMs to Prioritize Privileged Instructions

Eric Wallace, Kai Xiao, Reimar Leike +3

Today's LLMs are susceptible to prompt injections, jailbreaks, and other attacks that allow adversaries to overwrite a model's original instructions with their own malicious prompt…