collaborators

5 papers

cs.GT2026

Differentiable Combinatorial Auction Design: Optimizing Revenue-Welfare-Fairness Frontiers With Graph Attention Networks

Mai Pham, Vikrant Vaze, Peter Chin

Designing optimal auctions for allocating public infrastructure-such as airport slots and energy resources-is challenging due to interdependent resources and complex side-constrain…

cs.GT2026

L2R-EV: Learning What to Repair in Electric Ride-Pooling with Finite Charger Queues

Mai Pham, Vikrant S. Vaze, Peter Chin

Electric ride-pooling must jointly manage passenger service, routes, batteries, and finite chargers; a locally useful relocation can reduce later service. We introduce a discrete-e…

cs.LG2026

Optimistic Policy Regularization: Elite-Statistic Reward Shaping

Mai Pham, Vikrant Vaze, Peter Chin

On-policy agents discard trajectories after each update, including rare high-return episodes. We propose Optimistic Policy Regularization (OPR), which turns those episodes into a c…

cs.GT2025

Strategic Cyber Defense via Reinforcement Learning-Guided Combinatorial Auctions

Mai Pham, Vikrant Vaze, Peter Chin

Cyber defense operations increasingly require long-term strategic planning under uncertainty and resource constraints. We propose a new use of combinatorial auctions for allocating…

cs.GT2025

Advancing Differentiable Economics: A Neural Network Framework for Revenue-Maximizing Combinatorial Auction Mechanisms

Mai Pham, Vikrant Vaze, Peter Chin

Differentiable economics, which uses neural networks as function approximators and gradient-based optimization in automated mechanism design (AMD), marked a significant breakthroug…