3 papers
cs.GT2026
Robust Stable Matchings: Dealing with Changes in Preferences
Rohith Reddy Gangam, Tung Mai, Nitya Raju +1
We study stable matchings that are robust to preference changes in the two-sided stable matching setting of Gale and Shapley [GS62]. Given two instances and on the same set…
cs.GT2025
Fair Rent Division: New Budget and Rent Constraints
Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V. Vazirani
We study the classical rent division problem, where agents must allocate indivisible rooms and split a fixed total rent . The goal is to compute an envy-free (EF) alloca…
cs.GT2025
On the Core of the -Matching Game
Rohith Reddy Gangam, Shayan Taherijam, Vijay V. Vazirani
The core is a quintessential solution concept for profit sharing in cooperative game theory. An imputation allocates the worth of the given game among its agents. The imputation li…