6 papers
Learning Real-Life Approval Elections
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3
We study the independent approval model (IAM) for approval elections, where each candidate has its own approval probability and is approved independently of the other ones. This mo…
Participatory Budgeting Project Strength via Candidate Control
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Dušan Knop +4
We study the complexity of candidate control in participatory budgeting elections. The goal of constructive candidate control is to ensure that a given candidate wins by either add…
The Cost Perspective of Liquid Democracy: Feasibility and Control
Shiri Alouf-Heffetz, Łukasz Janeczko, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We examine an approval-based model of Liquid Democracy with a budget constraint on voting and delegating costs, aiming to centrally select casting voters ensuring complete represen…
Strategic Cost Selection in Participatory Budgeting
Piotr Faliszewski, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +3
We study strategic behavior of project proposers in the context of approval-based participatory budgeting (PB). In our model we assume that the votes are fixed and known and the pr…
Discovering Consistent Subelections
Łukasz Janeczko, Jérôme Lang, Grzegorz Lisowski +1
We show how hidden interesting subelections can be discovered in ordinal elections. An interesting subelection consists of a reasonably large set of voters and a reasonably large s…
Selecting the Most Conflicting Pair of Candidates
Théo Delemazure, Łukasz Janeczko, Andrzej Kaczmarczyk +1
We study committee elections from a perspective of finding the most conflicting candidates, that is, candidates that imply the largest amount of conflict, as per voter preferences.…