1 citations · 2 across the 7 of their papers we have counts for
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Algorithms for Equilibria in Concurrent Stopping Games
Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, K. S. Thejaswini
Concurrent games are a standard model for multi-agent systems, with Nash equilibrium as their central solution concept. The associated \emph{constrained existence problem}---does a…
Equilibria in Multiplayer Graph Games: An Algorithmic Study
Léonard Brice
To verify the robustness of a program or protocol, it is common in the computer science community to rely on the theoretical framework of game theory. In particular, if one seeks t…
Randomise Alone, Reach as a Team
Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, Alipasha Montaseri +2
We study concurrent graph games where n players cooperate against an opponent to reach a set of target states. Unlike traditional settings, we study distributed randomisation: team…
Dicey Games: Shared Sources of Randomness in Distributed Systems
Léonard Brice, Thomas A. Henzinger, K. S. Thejaswini
Consider a 4-player version of Matching Pennies where a team of three players competes against the Devil. Each player simultaneously says "Heads" or "Tails". The team wins if all f…
ε-Stationary Nash Equilibria in Multi-player Stochastic Graph Games
Ali Asadi, Léonard Brice, Krishnendu Chatterjee +1
A strategy profile in a multi-player game is a Nash equilibrium if no player can unilaterally deviate to achieve a strictly better payoff. A profile is an -Nash equilibrium if n…
Finding equilibria: simpler for pessimists, simplest for optimists
Léonard Brice, Thomas Henzinger, K. S. Thejaswini
We consider simple stochastic games with terminal-node rewards and multiple players, who have differing perceptions of risk. Specifically, we study risk-sensitive equilibria (RSEs)…