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cs.GT2026
A Weakly Group Strategy-Proof and Pareto-Stable Matching Mechanism with Two-Sided Indifferences under Gross Substitutes
Yasushi Kawase, Ryosuke Sato
We study finite many-to-one matching markets with indifferences on both sides and publicly known firm preferences over sets of workers. A standard approach breaks ties uniformly at…
cs.GT2026
Ascending Auctions for Combinatorial Markets with Frictions: A Unified Framework via Discrete Convex Analysis
Taihei Oki, Ryosuke Sato
We develop a unified ascending-auction framework for computing Walrasian equilibria in combinatorial markets with strong substitutes valuations and piecewise-linear payment functio…