most citedPinning Is Futile: You Need More Than Local Dependency Versioning to Defend against Supply Chain Attacks

6 citations · 6 across the 5 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

5 papers

cs.CR2026

The Software Supply Chain as a Market for Lemons: A Multivocal Review of Trust Signal Collapse

Ranindya Paramitha, Christian Kästner, Laurie Williams

Practitioners evaluating open-source dependencies rely on cheap trust signals, e.g., stars, download counts, and contributor activity, as substitutes for direct code inspection, as…

cs.CR2026

The Rising Cost of Trust: Practitioners' Trust Signals, Controls, and Responses in the Software Supply Chain

Ranindya Paramitha, Siri Paidipalli, Laurie Williams +1

The software supply chain is becoming more complex, and AI is reshaping its threat landscape, e.g., raising concerns about the quality of AI-generated dependencies. Seen through th…

cs.SE2026

The ICSE 2026 Shadow PC: Training the Next Generation of Reviewers Through Deliberate Practice

Christian Kästner, Michael Hilton, Jonathan Bell +1

Peer review is essential to software engineering research, yet reviewer training remains largely implicit. We describe the ICSE 2026 Shadow PC, a redesigned program emphasizing del…

cs.SE2026

3100 Opinions on Code Review in an AI World: Building Causal Theory from Practitioner Discourse

Shyam Agarwal, Courtney Miller, Christian Kästner +1

Coding agents now author entire pull requests, and practitioners sharply disagree about what this does to code review: whether it becomes the bottleneck, whether human review is st…

cs.SE2025★ 6 cited

Pinning Is Futile: You Need More Than Local Dependency Versioning to Defend against Supply Chain Attacks

Hao He, Bogdan Vasilescu, Christian Kästner

Recent high-profile incidents in open-source software have greatly raised practitioner attention on software supply chain attacks. To guard against potential malicious package upda…