145 citations · 145 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
10 papers · 1 filter
Test-time Reinforcement Learning in Imperfect Information Games
Ondrej Kubicek, Viliam Lisy, Tuomas Sandholm
Test-time reasoning has significantly improved performance in domains ranging from games to language models. However, test-time policy changes with formal guarantees on the perform…
Watermarked Game Solving via Perturbed Regret Minimization
Juho Kim, Tuomas Sandholm
Many real-world interactions among self-interested parties can be modeled by game theory, and the rapid advancements in AI have raised concerns about the possible misuse---accident…
On the Complexity of Correlated Equilibria Beyond Normal-Form Games
Ioannis Anagnostides, Constantinos Daskalakis, Gabriele Farina +3
Correlated equilibria are a fundamental solution concept in game theory. However, despite decades of research, the complexity beyond games of polynomial type -- such as extensive-f…
Domain-Independent Game Abstraction using Word Embedding Techniques
Juho Kim, Tuomas Sandholm
Many games of interest in the real world are often intractably large, thereby necessitating the use of game abstraction to shrink them in size, typically by many magnitudes. Over t…
Watermarking Game-Playing Agents in Perfect-Information Extensive-Form Games
Juho Kim, Fei Fang, Tuomas Sandholm
Watermarking techniques for large language models (LLMs), which encode hidden information in the output so its source can be verified, have gained significant attention in recent d…
General search techniques without common knowledge for imperfect-information games, and application to superhuman Fog of War chess
Brian Hu Zhang, Tuomas Sandholm
Since the advent of AI, games have served as progress benchmarks. Meanwhile, imperfect-information variants of chess have existed for over a century, present extreme challenges, an…
Learning a Game by Paying the Agents
Brian Hu Zhang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen +1
We study the problem of learning the utility functions of no-regret learning agents in a repeated normal-form game. Differing from most prior literature, we introduce a principal w…
Solving Infinite-Player Games with Player-to-Strategy Networks
Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm
We present a new approach to solving games with a countably or uncountably infinite number of players. Such games are often used to model multiagent systems with a large number of…
On the Power of Perturbation under Sampling in Solving Extensive-Form Games
Wataru Masaka, Mitsuki Sakamoto, Kenshi Abe +3
We investigate how perturbation does and does not improve the Follow-the-Regularized-Leader (FTRL) algorithm in solving imperfect-information extensive-form games under sampling, w…
Joint-perturbation simultaneous pseudo-gradient
Carlos Martin, Tuomas Sandholm
We study the problem of computing an approximate Nash equilibrium of a game whose strategy space is continuous without access to gradients of the utility function. Such games arise…