1 citations · 1 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
2 papers
cs.LG2025
No-regret incentive-compatible online learning under exact truthfulness with non-myopic experts
Junpei Komiyama, Nishant A. Mehta, Ali Mortazavi
We study an online forecasting setting in which, over rounds, strategic experts each report a forecast to a mechanism, the mechanism selects one forecast, and then the outc…
cs.LG2024★ 1 cited
On the price of exact truthfulness in incentive-compatible online learning with bandit feedback: A regret lower bound for WSU-UX
Ali Mortazavi, Junhao Lin, Nishant A. Mehta
In one view of the classical game of prediction with expert advice with binary outcomes, in each round, each expert maintains an adversarially chosen belief and honestly reports th…