activity
20232026
most citedData Market Design through Deep Learning

4 citations · 5 across the 11 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

13 papers

cs.AI2026

Cogentic: Multi-Agent Orchestration for Automated Proof Discovery

Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4

We present Cogentic, a multi-agent harness for automated proof discovery on open research problems. While frontier language models can generate strong mathematical ideas in a singl…

cs.GT2026

Efficiency of Generalized Proportional First-Price Auctions Under Auto-bidding

Yang Cai, Vineet Gupta, Yanchen Jiang +4

Auto-bidding is now widely adopted in online advertising platforms, allowing advertisers to specify high-level campaign objectives--such as maximizing total value subject to a retu…

cs.IR2026

One Model, Two Markets: Bid-Aware Generative Recommendation

Yanchen Jiang, Zhe Feng, Christopher P. Mah +2

Generative Recommender Systems using semantic ids, such as TIGER (Rajput et al., 2023), have emerged as a widely adopted competitive paradigm in sequential recommendation. However,…

cs.SI2026★ 1 cited

The Prosocial Ranking Challenge: Reducing Polarization on Social Media without Sacrificing Engagement

Jonathan Stray, Ian Baker, George Beknazar-Yuzbashev +41

We report the first direct comparisons of multiple alternative social media algorithms on multiple platforms on outcomes of societal interest. We used a browser extension to modify…

cs.AI2026

LLM Active Alignment: A Nash Equilibrium Perspective

Tonghan Wang, Yuqi Pan, Xinyi Yang +3

We develop a game-theoretic framework for predicting and steering the behavior of populations of large language models (LLMs) through Nash equilibrium (NE) analysis. To avoid the i…

cs.CL2025

Incentive-Aligned Multi-Source LLM Summaries

Yanchen Jiang, Zhe Feng, Aranyak Mehta

Large language models (LLMs) are increasingly used in modern search and answer systems to synthesize multiple, sometimes conflicting, texts into a single response, yet current pipe…

cs.GT2025

LLM Bidders Preserve the Mechanism-Level Orderings of Human Bidders

Anand Shah, Kehang Zhu, Yanchen Jiang +4

Training on vast amounts of human-generated data has motivated growing interest in using large language models (LLMs) to simulate human behavior. We ask which features of human beh…

cs.GT2025

BundleFlow: Deep Menus for Combinatorial Auctions by Diffusion-Based Optimization

Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

Differentiable economics -- the use of deep learning for auction design -- has driven progress in the automated design of multi-item auctions with additive or unit-demand valuation…

cs.AI2025

LLM-Powered Preference Elicitation in Combinatorial Assignment

Ermis Soumalias, Yanchen Jiang, Kehang Zhu +3

We study the potential of large language models (LLMs) as proxies for humans to simplify preference elicitation (PE) in combinatorial assignment. While traditional PE methods rely…

cs.GT2024

Charting the Shapes of Stories with Game Theory

Constantinos Daskalakis, Ian Gemp, Yanchen Jiang +3

Stories are records of our experiences and their analysis reveals insights into the nature of being human. Successful analyses are often interdisciplinary, leveraging mathematical…

cs.LG2024

On Diffusion Models for Multi-Agent Partial Observability: Shared Attractors, Error Bounds, and Composite Flow

Tonghan Wang, Heng Dong, Yanchen Jiang +2

Multiagent systems grapple with partial observability (PO), and the decentralized POMDP (Dec-POMDP) model highlights the fundamental nature of this challenge. Whereas recent approa…

cs.GT2024

GemNet: Menu-Based, Strategy-Proof Multi-Bidder Auctions Through Deep Learning

Tonghan Wang, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

Automated mechanism design (AMD) uses computational methods for mechanism design. Differentiable economics is a form of AMD that uses deep learning to learn mechanism designs and h…

cs.GT2023★ 4 cited

Data Market Design through Deep Learning

Sai Srivatsa Ravindranath, Yanchen Jiang, David C. Parkes

The data market design problem is a problem in economic theory to find a set of signaling schemes (statistical experiments) to maximize expected revenue to the information seller,…