12 citations · 25 across the 8 of their papers we have counts for
5 papers · 1 filter
Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper
In [Van Benthem 2007] the concept of a public announcement is used to study the effect of the iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies. We offer a simple generalisatio…
The Role of Monotonicity in the Epistemic Analysis of Strategic Games
Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper
It is well-known that in finite strategic games true common belief (or common knowledge) of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive the iterat…
Proof-theoretic Analysis of Rationality for Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Jonathan A. Zvesper, Krzysztof R. Apt
In the context of strategic games, we provide an axiomatic proof of the statement Common knowledge of rationality implies that the players will choose only strategies that survive…
Distributed iterated elimination of strictly dominated strategies
Andreas Witzel, Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper
We characterize epistemic consequences of truthful communication among rational agents in a game-theoretic setting. To this end we introduce normal-form games equipped with an inte…
Common Beliefs and Public Announcements in Strategic Games with Arbitrary Strategy Sets
Krzysztof R. Apt, Jonathan A. Zvesper
We provide an epistemic analysis of arbitrary strategic games based on possibility correspondences. We first establish a generic result that links true common beliefs (and, respect…