6 papers
TTC Domains
Sumit Goel, Yuki Tamura
For the object reallocation problem, we study whether characterizations of Top Trading Cycles (TTC) based on individual rationality, efficiency, and strategyproofness on the unrest…
Feedback in Dynamic Contests: Theory and Experiment
Sumit Goel, Yiqing Yan, Jeffrey Zeidel
We study the effect of interim feedback policies in a dynamic all-pay auction where two players bid over two stages to win a common-value prize. We show that sequential equilibrium…
Swap Bounded Envy
Federico Echenique, Sumit Goel, SangMok Lee
We study fairness in the allocation of discrete goods. Exactly fair (envy-free) allocations are impossible, so we discuss notions of approximate fairness. In particular, we focus o…
An efficiency ordering of k-price auctions under complete information
Sumit Goel, Jeffrey Zeidel
We study -price auctions in a complete information environment and characterize all pure-strategy Nash equilibrium outcomes. In a setting with agents having ordered valuatio…
Multi-agent contract design with a budget
Sumit Goel, Wade Hann-Caruthers
We study a multi-agent contract design problem with moral hazard. In our model, each agent exerts costly effort towards an individual task at which it may either succeed or fail, a…
The effect of competition in contests: A unifying approach
Andrzej Baranski, Sumit Goel
We study how increasing competition, by making prizes more unequal, affects effort in contests. In a finite type-space environment, we characterize the equilibrium, analyze the eff…