activity
20072026
most citedStrategy iteration is strongly polynomial for 2-player turn-based stochastic games with a constant discount factor

13 citations · 36 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

17 papers

cs.GT2026

Existence and computation of monomial families of near-optimal strategies for recursive games

Peter Bro Miltersen

In a finite recursive game in the sense of Everett, both players have stationary epsilon-optimal strategies for every epsilon>0. Frederiksen and Miltersen strengthened this result…

cs.DC2026

Safe Quotes for Retroactive Liquidity Pools

Peter Bro Miltersen

Automated market makers exchange assets through liquidity pools whose quoted prices depend on their reserves, with constant product pools being the most common. When such pools res…

cs.GT2016★ 6 cited

Walrasian Pricing in Multi-unit Auctions

Simina Brânzei, Aris Filos-Ratsikas, Peter Bro Miltersen +1

Multi-unit auctions are a paradigmatic model, where a seller brings multiple units of a good, while several buyers bring monetary endowments. It is well known that Walrasian equili…

cs.GT2015

Computation of Stackelberg Equilibria of Finite Sequential Games

Branislav Bosansky, Simina Branzei, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen +2

The Stackelberg equilibrium solution concept describes optimal strategies to commit to: Player 1 (termed the leader) publicly commits to a strategy and Player 2 (termed the followe…

cs.GT2015★ 6 cited

Characterization and Computation of Equilibria for Indivisible Goods

Simina Brânzei, Hadi Hosseini, Peter Bro Miltersen

We consider the problem of allocating indivisible goods in a way that is fair, using one of the leading market mechanisms in economics: the competitive equilibrium from equal incom…

cs.GT2014★ 2 cited

The complexity of approximating a trembling hand perfect equilibrium of a multi-player game in strategic form

Kousha Etessami, Kristoffer Arnsfelt Hansen, Peter Bro Miltersen +1

We consider the task of computing an approximation of a trembling hand perfect equilibrium for an n-player game in strategic form, n >= 3. We show that this task is complete for th…