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cs.GT2025
Impartial Selection with Predictions
Javier Cembrano, Felix Fischer, Max Klimm
We study the selection of agents based on mutual nominations, a theoretical problem with many applications from committee selection to AI alignment. As agents both select and are s…
cs.GT2024
Packing a Knapsack with Items Owned by Strategic Agents
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Martin Knaack
This paper considers a scenario within the field of mechanism design without money where a mechanism designer is interested in selecting items with maximum total value under a knap…
cs.GT2024
Impartial Selection Under Combinatorial Constraints
Javier Cembrano, Max Klimm, Arturo Merino
Impartial selection problems are concerned with the selection of one or more agents from a set based on mutual nominations from within the set. To avoid strategic nominations of th…