3 citations · 3 across the 1 of their papers we have counts for
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Information Design with Elicitation and Strategic Coordination
Alessandro Bonatti, Munther A. Dahleh, Thibaut Horel
We study linear-quadratic games of incomplete information with Gaussian uncertainty, where each player's payoff depends on a privately observed type and a common state. The designe…
Mitigating Information Asymmetry in Two-Stage Contracts with Non-Myopic Agents
Munther A. Dahleh, Thibaut Horel, M. Umar B. Niazi
We consider a Stackelberg game in which a principal (she) establishes a two-stage contract with a non-myopic agent (he) whose type is unknown. The contract takes the form of an inc…
Towards Data Auctions with Externalities
Anish Agarwal, Munther Dahleh, Thibaut Horel +1
The design of data markets has gained importance as firms increasingly use machine learning models fueled by externally acquired training data. A key consideration is the externali…