8 papers
Designing Pairwise-Stable Agent Seating Arrangements
Frederik Glitzner
Many fundamental problems in multi-agent systems involve the arrangement of agents, who have preferences over each other, on a target graph. These problems include, for example, St…
Near-Feasible Stable Matchings: Incentives and Optimality
Frederik Glitzner
Stable matching is a fundamental area with many practical applications, such as centralised clearinghouses for school choice or job markets. Recent work has introduced the paradigm…
Stable Matching with Deviators and Conformists
Frederik Glitzner, Augustine Kwanashie, David Manlove
In the Stable Marriage and Stable Roommates problems, there are inherent trade-offs between the size and stability of solutions. While in the former problem, a stable matching alwa…
A Minimax Perspective on Almost-Stable Matchings
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
Stability is crucial in matching markets, yet in many real-world settings - from hospital residency allocations to roommate assignments - full stability is either unachievable or c…
Unsolvability and Beyond in Many-To-Many Non-Bipartite Stable Matching
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
We study the Stable Fixtures problem, a many-to-many generalisation of the classical non-bipartite Stable Roommates matching problem. Building on the foundational work of Tan on st…
Perspectives on Unsolvability in the Roommates Problem
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
Instances of the well-studied Stable Roommates problem need not admit stable matchings. A long-standing open question posed by Gusfield and Irving (1989) asks about the behaviour o…
MATWA: A Web Toolkit for Matching under Preferences
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
Matching markets, where agents are assigned to one another based on preferences and capacity constraints, are pervasive in various domains. This paper introduces MATWA (https://mat…
Structural and Algorithmic Results for Stable Cycles and Partitions in the Roommates Problem
Frederik Glitzner, David Manlove
In the Stable Roommates problem, we seek a stable matching of the agents into pairs, in which no two agents have an incentive to deviate from their assignment. It is well known tha…