3 papers
cs.GT2025
On the Power of Randomization for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shiri Ron, Daniel Schoepflin
We investigate the problem of designing randomized obviously strategy-proof (OSP) mechanisms in several canonical auction settings. Obvious strategy-proofness, introduced by Li [Am…
cs.GT2024
Communication Separations for Truthful Auctions: Breaking the Two-Player Barrier
Shiri Ron, Clayton Thomas, S. Matthew Weinberg +1
We study the communication complexity of truthful combinatorial auctions, and in particular the case where valuations are either subadditive or single-minded, which we denote with…
cs.GT2023
Impossibilities for Obviously Strategy-Proof Mechanisms
Shiri Ron
We explore the approximation power of deterministic obviously strategy-proof mechanisms in auctions, where the objective is welfare maximization. A trivial ascending auction on the…