collaborators

11 papers

eess.SY2026

Welfarist Control Design -- How to fulfill the societal mandate in multi-agent control?

Sophie Hall, Kai Zhang, Ilia Shilov +2

At the core of most socio-technical systems lies a scarce resource that is allocated among agents: highway lanes, public transit, road space, water rights, energy access, grid capa…

econ.GN2026

Dynamic Resource Allocation with Karma: An Experimental Study

Ezzat Elokda, Saverio Bolognani, Florian Dörfler +1

We perform a behavioral experiment of karma, a class of mechanisms for repeated resource allocation with attractive fairness and efficiency properties, in theory. Individuals in th…

cs.GT2026

Invariant Price of Anarchy and Multiplicative Smoothness

Ilia Shilov, Heinrich H. Nax, Saverio Bolognani

The Price of Anarchy (PoA) is a popular measure of the costs of decentralization in terms of efficiency losses. Almost all PoA analyses operate within a framework assuming both Car…

cs.LG2026

An `Inverse' Experimental Framework to Estimate Market Efficiency

Thomas Asikis, Heinrich H. Nax

Digital marketplaces processing billions of dollars annually represent critical infrastructure in sociotechnical ecosystems, yet their performance optimization lacks principled mea…

econ.TH2026

Minimizing Volatility: Optimal Adjustment with Evolving Feasibility Constraints

Simon Jantschgi, Heinrich H. Nax, Bary S. R. Pradelski +1

Minimizing volatility and adjustment costs is of central importance in many economic environments, yet it is often complicated by evolving feasibility constraints. We study a decis…

econ.TH2025

Algorithmic Collusion is Algorithm Orchestration

Cesare Carissimo, Fryderyk Falniowski, Siavash Rahimi +1

We propose a fresh `meta-game' perspective on the problem of algorithmic collusion in pricing games a la Bertrand. Economists have interpreted the fact that algorithms can learn to…