1 citations · 2 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for
4 papers · 1 filter
Improved Combinatorial Auctions with and without Samples
Aviad Rubinstein, Sahil Singla
We give new mechanisms for combinatorial auctions in the offline, secretary, and prophet-with-samples models. Specifically, we obtain the following guarantees for social welfare ma…
Online Combinatorial Allocations and Auctions with Few Samples
Paul Dütting, Thomas Kesselheim, Brendan Lucier +2
In online combinatorial allocations/auctions, n bidders sequentially arrive, each with a combinatorial valuation (such as submodular/XOS) over subsets of m indivisible items. The a…
Improved Mechanisms and Prophet Inequalities for Graphical Dependencies
Vasilis Livanos, Kalen Patton, Sahil Singla
Over the past two decades, significant strides have been made in stochastic problems such as revenue-optimal auction design and prophet inequalities, traditionally modeled with …
Sample Complexity of Posted Pricing for a Single Item
Billy Jin, Thomas Kesselheim, Will Ma +1
Selling a single item to self-interested buyers is a fundamental problem in economics, where the two objectives typically considered are welfare maximization and revenue maximi…