1 citations · 2 across the 2 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
econ.TH2024★ 1 cited
Approximately Optimal Auctions With a Strong Bidder
Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim
We consider auctions with N+1 bidders. Of these, N are symmetric and N+1 is "sufficiently strong" relative to the others. The auction is a "tournament" in which the first N players…
econ.TH2024★ 1 cited
Tournament Auctions
Luca Anderlini, GaOn Kim
We examine ``tournament'' second-price auctions in which bidders compete for the right to participate in a second stage and contend against bidder . When the first bid…
econ.TH2024
When is Trust Robust?
Luca Anderlini, Larry Samuelson, Daniele Terlizzese
We examine an economy in which interactions are more productive if agents can trust others to refrain from cheating. Some agents are scoundrels, who cheat at every opportunity, whi…