3 papers
cs.GT2026
Non-obvious Manipulability with Groups in Shapley-Scarf Housing Markets
Louise Demoor, Martí Jané-Ballarín, Pierre Nunn +3
In Shapley-Scarf housing markets, Ma (1994) shows that top trading cycles (TTC) is the unique mechanism satisfying individual rationality (IR), Pareto efficiency (PE), and strategy…
cs.GT2026
MenuNet: A Strategy-Proof Mechanism for Matching Markets
Zhaohong Sun, Makoto Yokoo
Strategy-proofness is a fundamental desideratum in mechanism design, ensuring truthful reporting and robust participation. Stability is another central requirement in matching mark…
cs.GT2024
Friend- and Enemy-oriented Hedonic Games With Strangers Full Version
TJ Schlueter, Makoto Yokoo
We introduce friend- and enemy-oriented hedonic games with strangers (FOHGS and EOHGS respectively), two classes of hedonic games wherein agents are classified as friends, enemies,…