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20082022
most citedA Directed Graph Fourier Transform with Spread Frequency Components

60 citations · 130 across the 15 of their papers we have counts for

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8 papers · 1 filter

cs.GT2021

Eliciting Truthful Reports with Partial Signals in Repeated Games

Yutong Wu, Ali Khodabakhsh, Bo Li +2

We consider a repeated game where a player self-reports her usage of a service and is charged a payment accordingly by a center. The center observes a partial signal, representing…

cs.GT2018★ 1 cited

Optimal Mechanism Design with Risk-loving Agents

Evdokia Nikolova, Emmanouil Pountourakis, Ger Yang

One of the most celebrated results in mechanism design is Myerson's characterization of the revenue optimal auction for selling a single item. However, this result relies heavily o…

cs.GT2017

Reconciling Selfish Routing with Social Good

Soumya Basu, Ger Yang, Thanasis Lianeas +2

Selfish routing is a central problem in algorithmic game theory, with one of the principal applications being that of routing in road networks. Inspired by the emergence of routing…

cs.GT2017

When Does Diversity of User Preferences Improve Outcomes in Selfish Routing?

Richard Cole, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova

We seek to understand when heterogeneity in user preferences yields improved outcomes in terms of overall cost. That this might be hoped for is based on the common belief that dive…

cs.GT2015★ 10 cited

Asymptotically tight bounds for inefficiency in risk-averse selfish routing

Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova, Nicolas E. Stier-Moses

We consider a nonatomic selfish routing model with independent stochastic travel times, represented by mean and variance latency functions for each edge that depend on their flows.…

cs.GT2015

New Complexity Results and Algorithms for the Minimum Tollbooth Problem

Soumya Basu, Thanasis Lianeas, Evdokia Nikolova

The inefficiency of the Wardrop equilibrium of nonatomic routing games can be eliminated by placing tolls on the edges of a network so that the socially optimal flow is induced as…