5 papers
Characterizations of Proportional Division Value in TU-Games via Fixed-Population Consistency
Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, Satoshi Nakada +1
We study the proportional division value in TU-games, which distributes the grand coalition worth in proportion to the players' stand-alone worths. Focusing on fixed-population con…
Characterizing the ELS Values with Fixed-Population Invariance Axioms
Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, Satoshi Nakada +1
We study efficient, linear, and symmetric (ELS) values, a central family of allocation rules for cooperative games with transferable-utility (TU-games) that includes the Shapley va…
A Characterization of Egalitarian and Proportional Sharing Principles: An Efficient Extension Operator Approach
Yukihiko Funaki, Yukio Koriyama, Satoshi Nakada
Some well-known solutions for cooperative games with transferable utility (TU-games), such as the Banzhaf value, the Myerson value, and the Aumann-Dreze value, fail to satisfy effi…
Balanced contributions, consistency, and value for games with externalities
André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner
We consider fair and consistent extensions of the Shapley value for games with externalities. Based on the restriction identified by Casajus et al. (2024, Games Econ. Behavior 147,…
Random partitions, potential, value, and externalities
André Casajus, Yukihiko Funaki, Frank Huettner
The Shapley value equals a player's contribution to the potential of a game. The potential is a most natural one-number summary of a game, which can be computed as the expected acc…