136 citations · 515 across the 65 of their papers we have counts for
47 papers · 1 filter
Contextual Procurement Auctions with Bandit Learning
Yiling Chen, Shi Feng, Sadie Zhao
We study repeated procurement auctions in which producers have private costs and the platform must learn the context-dependent value of selecting each producer. We evaluate perform…
Evidence Markets
Safwan Hossain, Gabriel Andrade, Chengqi Zang +1
Modern prediction markets face two limitations that restrict their applicability in a range of settings:~(i)~they reveal what the crowd believes but not the evidence or reasoning b…
Learning to Persuade a Biased Receiver
Yuqi Pan, Sadie Zhao, Milind Tambe +1
We study a repeated information design setting in which the receiver, who is also the decision-maker, updates beliefs in a systematically biased way. More specifically, a distorted…
WOMAC: A Mechanism For Prediction Competitions
Siddarth Srinivasan, Tao Lin, Connacher Murphy +3
Competitions are widely used to identify top performers in judgmental forecasting and machine learning, and the standard competition design ranks competitors based on their cumulat…
Explainable Information Design
Yiling Chen, Tao Lin, Wei Tang +1
Optimal signaling schemes in information design (Bayesian persuasion) often involve randomization or disconnected partitions of state space, which might be too intricate to be audi…
Learning a Game by Paying the Agents
Brian Hu Zhang, Tao Lin, Yiling Chen +1
We study the problem of learning the utility functions of no-regret learning agents in a repeated normal-form game. Differing from most prior literature, we introduce a principal w…