11 papers
An axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion
Wataru Kitano, Shohei Yanagita
We develop an axiomatic model of robust Bayesian persuasion where the sender cannot fully control the information available to the receiver. After selecting an information structur…
A Simple Polynomial-Time EFX Repair for Cancelable Valuations
Hannaneh Akrami, Arash Ashuri, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury +2
The leximin++ proof of Plaut and Roughgarden for agents with identical monotone valuations gives a natural EFX-repair procedure: starting from an arbitrary partition, repeatedly tr…
Fully Distributed Tâtonnement for Chores Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +1
We study price-adjustment dynamics for computing competitive equilibria (CE) in Fisher markets with chores. Unlike in classical goods markets, prices in chores markets are payments…
Competitive Equilibrium in Labor Economies through the Lens of Goods and Chores Fisher Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Christian Kroer, Ruta Mehta +2
In this paper, we study a two-sided labor market that couples the classical Fisher market with goods and the Fisher market with bads into a single unified framework. In our model,…
Revenue-Optimal Pricing for Budget-Constrained Buyers in Data Markets
Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Jugal Garg, Eklavya Sharma +1
We study revenue-optimal pricing in data markets with rational, budget-constrained buyers. Such a market offers multiple datasets for sale, and buyers aim to improve the accuracy o…
Maximizing Nash Social Welfare in 2-Value Instances: Delineating Tractability
Hannaneh Akrami, Bhaskar Ray Chaudhury, Martin Hoefer +6
We study the problem of allocating a set of indivisible goods among a set of agents with \emph{2-value additive valuations}. In this setting, each good is valued either or $p/q…