3 papers
cs.GT2024
Equilibrium Computation in the Hotelling-Downs Model of Spatial Competition
Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne
The Hotelling-Downs model is a natural and appealing model for understanding strategic positioning by candidates in elections. In this model, voters are distributed on a line, repr…
cs.GT2024
Nearly Tight Bounds on Approximate Equilibria in Spatial Competition on the Line
Umang Bhaskar, Soumyajit Pyne
In Hotelling's model of spatial competition, a unit mass of voters is distributed in the interval (with their location corresponding to their political persuasion), and eac…
cs.GT2023
Nearly Equitable Allocations Beyond Additivity and Monotonicity
Siddharth Barman, Umang Bhaskar, Yeshwant Pandit +1
Equitability (EQ) in fair division requires that items be allocated such that all agents value the bundle they receive equally. With indivisible items, an equitable allocation may…