2 citations · 3 across the 3 of their papers we have counts for
3 papers
Approaching Utopia: Strong Truthfulness and Externality-Resistant Mechanisms
Amos Fiat, Anna R. Karlin, Elias Koutsoupias +1
We introduce and study strongly truthful mechanisms and their applications. We use strongly truthful mechanisms as a tool for implementation in undominated strategies for several p…
A complete characterization of group-strategyproof mechanisms of cost-sharing
Emmanouil Pountourakis, Angelina Vidali
We study the problem of designing group-strategyproof cost-sharing mechanisms. The players report their bids for getting serviced and the mechanism decides which players are going…
A characterization of 2-player mechanisms for scheduling
George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Angelina Vidali
We study the mechanism design problem of scheduling unrelated machines and we completely characterize the decisive truthful mechanisms for two players when the domain contains both…