activity
20082026
most citedTruthful Allocation Mechanisms Without Payments: Characterization and Implications on Fairness

28 citations · 46 across the 20 of their papers we have counts for

collaborators

26 papers

cs.GT2026

Universally truthful mechanisms for scheduling

Georgios Anastasiadis, George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias +2

We consider universally truthful randomized mechanisms for the problem of scheduling jobs on unrelated machines. We prove a lower bound on the expected approximation ratio…

cs.GT2024

Mechanism design augmented with output advice

George Christodoulou, Alkmini Sgouritsa, Ioannis Vlachos

Our work revisits the design of mechanisms via the learning-augmented framework. In this model, the algorithm is enhanced with imperfect (machine-learned) information concerning th…

cs.GT2023

A proof of the Nisan-Ronen conjecture

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs

Noam Nisan and Amir Ronen conjectured that the best approximation ratio of deterministic truthful mechanisms for makespan-minimization for unrelated machines is . This work…

cs.GT2022

Truthful Aggregation of Budget Proposals with Proportionality Guarantees

Ioannis Caragiannis, George Christodoulou, Nicos Protopapas

We study a participatory budgeting problem, where a set of strategic agents wish to split a divisible budget among different projects, by aggregating their proposals on a single di…

cs.GT2021

Truthful allocation in graphs and hypergraphs

George Christodoulou, Elias Koutsoupias, Annamaria Kovacs

We study truthful mechanisms for allocation problems in graphs, both for the minimization (i.e., scheduling) and maximization (i.e., auctions) setting. The minimization problem is…

cs.DB2021

HINT: A Hierarchical Index for Intervals in Main Memory

George Christodoulou, Panagiotis Bouros, Nikos Mamoulis

Indexing intervals is a fundamental problem, finding a wide range of applications. Recent work on managing large collections of intervals in main memory focused on overlap joins an…